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Educational Inequality and the Science of 
Diversity in Grutter: A Lesson for the Reparations 
Debate in the Age of Obama 
Derrick Darby* 
Courts know today that statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in 
vacuo, as pronouncements of abstract principles for the guidance of an 
ideal community, but in the setting and the framework of present-day 
conditions, as revealed by the labors of economists and students of the 
social sciences in our own country and abroad.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
More than five decades after Brown v. Board of Education,2 there 
remains a crisis of black student educational underachievement relative 
to white students in the United States.  And this sobering fact may well 
have been at the forefront of President Barack Obama’s mind during a 
presidential primary address in South Carolina when he remarked: “I 
think the reparations we need right here in South Carolina is investment, 
for example, in our schools.”3  He was certainly not suggesting that no 
blacks have fared well since Brown.  Indeed many blacks have obviously 
excelled in both educational achievement and attainment.  Moreover, 
many blacks have enjoyed positive labor market outcomes and have even 
garnered a share of power, prestige, and influence in American society—
as Obama’s unprecedented success in running for and being elected 
President of the United States so vividly illustrates.  Rather, the crucial 
point he was flagging is that blacks in general remain grossly 
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reparations.  My thanks to the outstanding group of 2L and 3L law students, graduate students in 
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and social scientific explanations of the persistence of racial inequality were instrumental in shaping 
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 1. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 81 (1921). 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. Then-Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at CNN/YouTube Democratic Presidential Debate, 
Apr. 26, 2007, transcript available at http://www.cnn/2007/POLITICS/07/23/debate.transcript/ (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2009). 
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overrepresented in the ranks of underachieving students and 
underrepresented in the ranks of high achieving students.  That point is 
supported by various measures of academic achievement and success 
including, but not limited to, K–12 standardized test scores, grade point 
averages, graduation rates, and performance on college and professional 
school entrance exams such as the SAT and LSAT.4  As President 
Obama clearly understood, the existence of lower quality schools in 
segregated and predominately black communities is one of many 
competing explanations of why the racial academic achievement gap 
persists. 
In addition to wondering why this gap persists, or more specifically, 
wondering how economists and other social scientists have explained the 
causes of this gap, students of law and philosophy, and indeed anyone 
concerned about the pressing problem of educational inequality in the 
United States, may wonder: How have this gap and empirical 
explanations of the relevant causes shaped the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence on educational inequality in higher 
education in what might be described as the “post-racial” era in the 
United States?  Furthermore, these students may wonder: What does any 
of this have to do with the raging public and scholarly debate over black 
reparations for slavery and Jim Crow?  The main objective of this Article 
is to set the stage for a fuller treatment of these two questions by 
attending to Grutter v. Bollinger,5 a recent Supreme Court ruling on the 
constitutionality of a race-conscious law school admissions policy.6  
Special attention will be paid to the Court’s use of social scientific 
research on student body diversity in Grutter. 
The Article unfolds as follows.  Part II provides an overview of 
recent empirical data establishing the existence of racial disparities in 
educational achievement along with a short summary of the main 
explanations of the causes.  Part III provides a general characterization of 
what might be called the “post-racial” era in the United States, along 
with implications for how many people think about racial discrimination 
                                                          
 4. See infra Part II for an overview of the relevant data concerning racial disparities in 
educational achievement. 
 5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 6. A fuller treatment would also consider, among other things, the Court’s recent ruling on 
race-conscious student assignment plans at the K–12 educational level.  See Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  For an illuminating discussion of this 
case, which argues that the Court should have reached a different outcome, see generally Leslie 
Yalof Garfield, Adding Colors to the Chameleon: Why the Supreme Court Should Have Adopted a 
New Compelling Government Interest Test for Race-Preference Student Assignment Plans, 56 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 277 (2008). 
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today.  Part IV begins with a summary of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Grutter.  It is then observed that this decision comports with a vital 
way in which the pursuit of race-conscious remedies for racial 
inequalities in educational achievement is seriously constrained in the 
post-racial era.  This observation is followed by a discussion of how 
empirical explanations of the benefits of racial (and other forms of 
student body) diversity figure into Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion 
for the Court and into Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion, with an eye 
toward extracting a lesson for the current public and scholarly debate 
over whether blacks are owed reparations for educational inequality.7  
This lesson, which is presented in Part V, highlights a serious inadequacy 
of a prevailing normative argument for reparations—an argument that is 
tethered to particular social scientific explanations of the root causes of 
racial inequalities in education.8 
The inadequacy of this argument does not require us to forego 
further attempts to argue that blacks are owed reparations.  However, it 
does invite proponents of reparations to fashion alternative normative 
arguments that cannot be derailed by empirical disagreements over the 
root causes of racial inequalities in education and in other areas.  While I 
am not suggesting that these empirical disagreements cannot be settled, it 
is imperative to ensure that one’s normative case is not indefinitely 
delayed pending the outcome of such a settlement.  Hence, a more 
promising normative argument—the development of which I must leave 
for another occasion—might be fittingly described as an “unscientific” 
argument for reparations.  This argument could reach a pro-reparations 
normative conclusion, such as recognizing a collective societal moral 
obligation to improve failing public schools in segregated black 
neighborhoods, without being derailed by the fact that there are 
competing empirical explanations of why the racial achievement gap 
persists. 
                                                          
 7. See generally ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT & FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK 
REPARATIONS (2004) (providing an excellent treatment of this topic and a powerful argument for the 
pro-reparations conclusion).  See also ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON (2006) 
(providing an excellent general and wide-ranging discussion of the reparations issue). 
 8. As I shall explain in more detail later, see infra Part V, the argument concerning reparations 
for educational inequality is an instance of a more general normative argument (the corrective justice 
argument), which has also been deployed to defend reparations for other instances of racial 
inequality, e.g., racial inequalities in wealth, health, housing, and matters of violence, crime, and 
punishment.  Some of the contributors to this symposium issue provide empirical support for the 
existence of these inequalities.  See generally Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Race, Residence, 
and Violent Crime: A Structure of Inequality, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 903 (2009); Cassia Spohn, Race, 
Sex, and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 879 (2009); Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the 
Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851 (2009). 
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II. EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITIES IN BLACK AND WHITE 
The empirical evidence for the existence of racial disparities in 
educational achievement is overwhelming and compelling.  It has been 
observed that black, Latino, and Native American children do not 
perform as well academically as non-Hispanic white and Asian 
American children.  It has also been noted that urban public school 
children, on average, do not perform as well academically as children in 
suburban schools, and that low-income children, on average, do not 
perform as well as their middle-income and upper-income counterparts.  
All of these observations suggest that class is as vital as race in 
understanding educational achievement gaps.  For present purposes I 
shall limit myself to highlighting some of the statistical disparities in 
educational achievement that pertain to the black-white achievement gap 
in particular.  Here we find that low-income black children from urban 
public schools are grossly overrepresented on the short side of the racial 
achievement gap, and vastly underrepresented on the high side of it when 
considering numerous measures of educational achievement including 
but not limited to: grade point averages, performance on standardized 
tests, placement in AP, honors, and college prep courses, school 
suspension, school expulsion, grade promotion, and graduation rates. 
Using numerous and varied data sources, social scientists have 
empirically tested and documented substantial disparities between blacks 
and whites in educational achievement at various stages of schooling, 
particularly in math and science, but in other subject areas as well.  It is 
widely held that relative to white student performance, black students 
underachieve in school when considering various comparative measures, 
including comparing the performance of poor and middle class blacks to 
whites, and comparing the performance of blacks in urban schools to the 
performance of blacks in suburban schools.  Moreover, these results are 
achieved even when controlling for a broad range of covariates, 
including: socioeconomic status, school quality, teacher quality, family 
and neighborhood characteristics, as well as levels of parental 
educational attainment, income, and wealth. 
The first major empirical study of the black-white educational 
achievement gap (the Coleman Report) found that not only did racial 
disparities appear at every grade level, but that the gap between black 
and white students also widened as they advanced in age and moved up 
in grade level.9  Some subsequent empirical studies have substantiated 
                                                          
 9. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 20 (1966); see 
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these findings relying on more current data sources.  For example, a 
recent statistical analysis report on educational achievement and black-
white inequality, released by the National Center for Education Statistics 
in 2001, documents a range of statistical disparities in educational 
achievement between black and white children at various grade levels.  
The main findings, which support the 1966 Coleman Report, are that at 
every grade level studied, black children scored lower than white 
children on mathematics and reading tests.  Also, in tracking the gap over 
time, it found that the gap (for mathematics) narrowed somewhat during 
elementary school, widened during junior high, and showed little change 
during high school.  The gap in reading also differed in size depending 
on grade level, although not as consistently as with the mathematics gap.  
The Report concludes that blacks in first grade have lower math and 
reading scores on average than whites and that the same is true by the 
time they reach the twelfth grade.10 
It has been suggested that things are not as bleak as they appear to 
be, as the racial achievement gap seems to have narrowed in recent years 
based on some findings.  For instance, the Great City Schools Council 
provides evidence of convergence in the country’s top urban school 
systems where the gap has been the most glaring.  They found that racial 
achievement gaps in math and reading achievement in urban schools 
appeared to be narrowing: 55.6% of fourth grades tested and 56.4% of 
eighth grades tested narrowed the math achievement gap between white 
and black students, and 57.6% of fourth grades tested narrowed this gap 
at a rate equal to or faster than their states.11  In reading, 84.6% of fourth 
grades tested and 63.3% of the eighth grades tested narrowed the reading 
achievement gap between white and black students, and 58.3% of fourth 
grades tested narrowed this gap at a rate equal to or faster than their 
states.12 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
also Adam Gamoran & Daniel A. Long, Equality of Educational Opportunity: A 40-Year 
Retrospective (Wis. Ctr. For Educ. Research, Working Paper No. 2006-9), available at 
http://www.wcer.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers/papers.php (summarizing major 
developments in the literature since the publication of the Coleman Report). 
 10. Jonathan Jacobson et al., Educational Achievement and Black-White Inequality, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. 32, 37, 42 (July 2001), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/ 
2001061.PDF. 
 11. Michael Casserly, Beating the Odds: A City-By-City Analysis of Student Performance and 
Achievement Gaps on State Assessments Results from the 2004−2005 School Year, 50th Council of 
the Great City Schools iv (March 2006), available at http://www.cgcs.org/images/ 
Publications/BTOVI.pdf. 
 12. Id. at v. 
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Although the Council of Great City Schools offers an encouraging 
report on efforts to close the racial achievement gap in the nation’s top 
urban schools, others have cited empirical evidence to the contrary.  
They claim that despite considerable convergence in the racial 
achievement gap during most of the 1980s, since the late 1980s the gap 
has actually widened considerably in numerous areas including math, 
reading, science, and writing.13  According to other empirical findings, 
the widening racial achievement gap is most pronounced when 
comparing high achieving black students with their white peers.14  
Enthusiasm about how much progress has been made in closing the 
racial achievement gap is further quelled by a recent statistical analysis 
report, Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic 
Minorities, released by the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) in 2007.  The report documents a range of statistical disparities 
between elementary and secondary school black and white school 
children on different measures of academic achievement.15  While the 
report observes that the racial achievement gap in both reading and 
mathematics has decreased between 1975 and 2004,16 suggesting that 
public education is moving in the right direction, the most recent data 
clearly establishes that white students continue to outperform black 
students in these subject areas. 
Furthermore, the NCES report highlights other worrisome trends that 
bear on academic achievement.  For example, the report finds evidence 
of black-white disparities in rates of advanced coursework—such as AP 
or honors classes—in high school, with Asian/Pacific Islanders 
outperforming all other racial/ethnic groups.17  It also finds disparities in 
percentages of black and white students taking the SAT exam relative to 
their share of the population and it finds racial disparities in SAT test 
scores.18  According to the most recent data, in 2006, the average verbal 
                                                          
 13. See generally Jacob L. Vigdor & Jens Ludwig, Segregation and the Test Score Gap, in 
STEADY GAINS AND STALLED PROGRESS: INEQUALITY AND THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 
181–211 (Katherine Magnuson & Jane Waldfogel eds., 2008); Sean P. Corcoran & William N. 
Evans, The Role of Inequality in Teacher Quality, in Magnuson & Waldfogel, supra, at 212–49. 
 14. See Sean F. Reardon, Differential Growth in the Black-White Achievement Gap During 
Elementary School Among Initially High- and Low-Scoring Students 7–9 (Stanford Univ. Inst. for 
Res. on Educ. Pol’y & Prac., Working Paper No. 2008-07, 2008); Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. 
Rivkin, Harming the Best: How Schools Affect the Black-White Achievement Gap, J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. (forthcoming). 
 15. See generally Angelina KewalRamani et al., Status and Trends in the Education of Racial 
and Ethnic Minorities, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., NCES 2007-039 (Sept. 2007), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007039.pdf. 
 16. Id. at 46, 50. 
 17. Id. at 64–74. 
 18. Id. at 76. 
2.0 DARBY FINAL 4/23/2009  1:15:42 PM 
2009] EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 761 
score for white students was 527 while the average score for black 
students was 434, which puts whites at the top and blacks at the very 
bottom of this achievement spread.19  The data also showed the gap 
between their average mathematics score, which exceeded 100 points, 
with whites averaging 536 (second only to Asian/Pacific Islanders) and 
blacks averaging 429, which still puts blacks at the very bottom of the 
achievement spread.20  There are also worrisome statistics regarding 
factors apart from grades and test performance that have obvious bearing 
on academic achievement.  For instance, the NCES report also finds that 
in 2003, a higher percentage of black elementary and secondary students 
than white students had been suspended from school (20% of black 
students and 9% of white students), retained a grade (17% of black 
students and 8% of white students), or expelled (5% of black students 
and 1% of white students).21  The report also found that in 2005, the 
dropout rate for black high school students was 10%, contrasted with 6% 
for whites.22 
What should we make of these and other glaring statistical disparities 
in educational achievement between blacks and whites?  More 
specifically, why do they persist and what is wrong with them?  
Responses to these last two questions have been closely connected in 
some of the recent literature on black reparations, particularly where we 
find corrective justice-based arguments for (or against) black redress for 
slavery and Jim Crow.23  To be sure, the mere fact of these statistical 
disparities in educational achievement does not tell us about their causes 
and it is commonplace to assume that without knowledge of these causes 
we cannot assess their moral significance.  In particular, it is assumed 
that without such knowledge we cannot determine who or what is 
morally responsible for the existence of these disparities; we cannot 
determine who is morally responsible for eradicating them; and, 
presumably, we cannot even determine whether their persistence is 
objectionable from the moral point of view. 
Hence, it would appear that ascertaining the empirical causes of 
educational inequalities is vital for our moral project of appraising them 
and determining the moral obligations that they generate.  Yet we must 
take care not to presume that the close link between establishing 
educational policy (or interpreting law) and ascertaining the empirical 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 77. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 86. 
 22. Id. at 88. 
 23. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7, at ch. 3. 
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causes of educational inequality suggests that there is also a close link 
between normatively appraising educational inequality and ascertaining 
its empirical causes.  Ideally, we should seek a normative appraisal of the 
racial achievement gap that is indifferent to the social scientific 
explanation of the underlying causes.  I hope that the reasons for this 
become apparent after we consider the role of such explanations in both 
the diversity in higher education debate and the reparations debate. 
In the meantime, social scientists studying social inequality know 
that they must go beyond merely positing statistical disparities in 
educational achievement, to defending explanations of their root causes.  
In addition to confirming the main empirical findings of the 1966 
Coleman Report on the racial achievement gap by using more current 
data sources, much of the subsequent empirical work in the social 
sciences has sought to ascertain the underlying causes of racial 
disparities in education.24  Two questions have guided this scholarship: 
What is the best empirical explanation of the racial achievement gap? 
And why has this gap not disappeared (or been dramatically diminished) 
in view of the legal and educational policy interventions designed to 
close the racial achievement gap?  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown is arguably the most important judicial intervention concerning 
education, and the No Child Left Behind Act of 200125 is arguably the 
most significant federal legislative intervention concerning education in 
the last decade. 
How have social scientists accounted for racial inequalities in 
education?  Although I do not undertake a survey and assessment of the 
full range of explanations in the social science literature, it is worth 
listing several prevalent ones.26  In the face of heavy criticism, some 
scholars have argued that blacks are genetically inferior to whites and 
that this inferiority manifests itself in differences in their cognitive 
abilities to do math and science and to read and write.  Others have 
argued that black students tend to come from non-standard family 
backgrounds with single parents (usually just a mother), and this 
                                                          
 24. A good place to start for a sampling of various social scientific perspectives on this issue, 
with an emphasis on the racial achievement gap in test scores, is THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE 
GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).  For a more recent volume, see Magnuson 
& Waldfogel, supra note 13. 
 25. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 26. For a very useful survey of prevailing social scientific explanations of the racial gap in 
education, see, e.g., Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, When Are Racial Disparities in Education the Result of 
Racial Discrimination?  A Social Science Perspective, 105 TCHRS. C. REC. 1052 (2003); Caroline 
Hodges Persell & Giselle F. Hendrie, Race, Education, and Inequality, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO SOCIAL INEQUALITIES 286 (Mary Romero & Eric Margolis eds., 2005). 
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manifests itself in lower levels of educational achievement than white 
students, who typically come from standard two-parent backgrounds.  A 
closely related argument is that black students tend to come from homes 
with lower socioeconomic status which place less importance on 
educational achievement for a variety of reasons, including cultural ones, 
and as a result, black students simply do not work as hard in school or 
study as much as white students.  In contrast, others have argued that 
many black students attend lower-quality and under-funded schools in 
crime-infested neighborhoods, and this has a detrimental impact on black 
academic performance.  Furthermore, some scholars have argued that 
black, unlike white, students are subjected to racial bias in standardized 
testing (a common measure of academic achievement) in addition to 
racial bias in teacher perceptions of their abilities.  Still others find that 
teacher expectations are greater for whites than for blacks and that these 
lower expectations negatively impact black student achievement, and 
that racial tracking and ability grouping—with blacks being largely 
absent in higher-level courses and disproportionately enrolled in lower-
level ones—accounts for a large part of the racial achievement gap.  
Lastly, it has been argued that black students typically receive stiffer and 
more damaging sanctions for misbehavior in school than their white 
peers, which often results in more time away from the classroom during 
regular school hours. 
Various analytical distinctions have been deployed to categorize the 
main explanations of the causes of racial inequality in general, and 
educational inequality in particular.  Setting aside the so-called 
biogenetic explanations of the racial achievement gap advanced by the 
controversial book The Bell Curve,27 which has been widely 
challenged,28 social scientists have sought to articulate the ways in which 
the social environment has contributed to racial disparities in education 
and in other areas.  The familiar structure versus behavior distinction has 
been captured by distinguishing between liberal and conservative 
explanations: liberals are taken to emphasize social factors such as 
“racial discrimination, low wages, inadequate schooling, [and] lack of 
jobs,” while conservatives are taken to stress cultural and behavioral 
factors “such as values, attitudes, habits, [expectations,] and styles.”29  
                                                          
 27. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). 
 28. See, e.g., CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE 
MYTH (1996). 
 29. For this distinction, see William Julius Wilson, The Role of the Environment in the Black-
White Test Score Gap, in Jencks & Phillips, supra note 24, at 502. 
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But more complex and dynamic explanations, which seek to transcend 
the social structure versus behavior dichotomy as being too 
“individualistic” on account of focusing exclusively on either attributes 
of individuals (behavior) or their particular social environment 
(structure), call attention to the social structure of inequality to explain 
differential group outcomes in education and in other areas.  Included 
among the processes that embody this social structure are: “the 
institutional influences on mobility and opportunity; the operation and 
organization of schools; the mechanisms of residential racial segregation 
and social isolation in poor neighborhoods; . . . unequal access to 
information concerning the labor market, financial markets, 
apprenticeship programs, and schools; . . . and corporate decisions 
concerning the location and mobility of industries.”30 
Obviously there is much at stake in how we explain the causes of 
group-based inequality in education, perhaps foremost of which is to 
discern how such explanations shape law and public policy.  Earlier I 
raised the following question: Why has the racial achievement gap not 
disappeared (or been dramatically diminished) in view of various legal 
(Brown) and education policy (NCLB) interventions designed to close it?  
To be sure, some observers may contend that the gap has indeed 
diminished and that further narrowing is only a matter of time.  Yet one 
could certainly contend that it has not disappeared entirely or been 
dramatically diminished, largely because legal and education policy has 
not been properly targeted to address the root causes of the racial 
achievement gap.  It seems plausible that the societal interventions with 
the best chance for success at closing the racial achievement gap will be 
interventions that target the underlying causes identified by the best 
overall empirical explanation of why the racial achievement gap persists. 
Although I certainly do not presume to know which public policy 
will have the best chance for success, and there is certainly deep 
disagreement about this in the social science literature as demonstrated 
above,31 some empirical work gives us reason to assume that both past 
and present racial discrimination continue to play a vital causal role in 
accounting for the existence of racial inequalities in educational 
achievement and attainment.32  Even if we assume that the role of racial 
discrimination in determining the life prospects of blacks in America has 
declined significantly, it is still plausible to assume that this explanatory 
factor will at least be part of the best overall explanation of why the 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 508. 
 31. See sources cited supra notes 24–30. 
 32. See Mickelson, supra note 26, at 1055–76. 
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racial achievement gap persists.  However, as I shall explain in the next 
section, appealing to racial discrimination as a cause of racial disparities 
in general—even as just one cause among many—faces serious obstacles 
in this post-racial era.  And this observation should shape our 
understanding and assessment of Grutter v. Bollinger.  Furthermore, it 
should shape our philosophical assessment of recent corrective-justice 
arguments for black reparations and other race-conscious social justice 
measures more generally. 
III.  RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE POST-RACIAL ERA 
Crafting a public policy or legal remedy that addresses the role of 
racial discrimination (even if it turns out to be a relatively small role) in 
creating educational and other persistent inequalities between blacks and 
whites has become increasingly difficult in America’s contemporary 
post-civil rights, or as I prefer to say, post-racial era.  First, many 
Americans believe that the United States has largely realized its dream of 
being a free and equal society with equal opportunity for all citizens, 
including black descendants of persons that endured the brutality and 
dehumanization of chattel slavery and American racial apartheid under 
Jim Crow segregation.33  Consequently, many citizens believe that a 
person’s life prospects in the United States are no longer meaningfully 
determined (or hampered) by the color of their skin, but largely by the 
content of their character, their values, their work ethic, their success in 
taking advantage of opportunities, and their level of education. 
Many people would say that at long last—particularly in the 
aftermath of electing the first African American U.S. President—we are 
living the American dream envisioned, and so eloquently articulated, by 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. more than four decades ago during the 
historic 1963 March on Washington.  Indeed it is easy to agree with one 
historian’s recent observation that perhaps “no figure more fully 
embodies the notion that racial equality is a U.S. national imperative than 
Martin Luther King Jr.”34  It is certainly true that Dr. King is also widely 
read as holding that civil rights reforms were not only “urgent matters of 
national redemption and moral regeneration that would open up a world 
for individual black achievement (the content of our character) beyond 
                                                          
 33. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
 34. NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR 
DEMOCRACY 3 (2004). 
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the barrier of race (the color of our skin),”35 but also that the passage and 
enforcement of civil rights reforms would enable the United States to 
live up to its normative promise by extending its cherished founding 
normative ideals of freedom and equality to all of its citizens—
particularly those descending from individuals characterized in the 
infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford36 decision as being “so far inferior, that 
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect . . . .”37 
Another crucial and related aspect of what has been aptly called a 
“King-centric”38 account of the civil rights era is the idea of shared 
citizenship, which is, in an important sense, post-ethnic or post-racial.39  
By extending the scope and protection of universal normative ideals to 
include blacks, the civil rights movement—according to a widely held 
understanding of racial progress—brought us the final way toward being 
a unified people living under a common rule of law equally applied to 
and protecting all persons living under shared normative ideals of 
freedom and equality.  This universalizing picture of citizenship 
associated with King, and characteristic of a post-racial understanding of 
American society, is aptly summed up by United States Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia as follows: “In the eyes of the government, we are 
just one race here.  It is American.”40 
Hence with the watershed Brown v. Board of Education decision in 
1954, the formal undoing of American racial apartheid was fully 
underway.  With President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 signing of Executive 
Order 10925, which established a Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunity and is famously remembered for invoking the phrase 
“affirmative action,” and with President Lyndon B. Johnson’s so-called 
                                                          
 35. Id. 
 36. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, 
XIV. 
 37. Id. at 407.  Of course one must attend to King’s anti-war stance and his work on behalf of 
organized labor and striking workers toward the end of his life to appreciate his doubts about 
whether civil rights was fully adequate to deal with other persistent legacies of black subordination, 
particularly wealth inequality and other forms of socioeconomic inequality. 
 38. CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND 
THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 419 (1995); see also SINGH, supra note 34, at 5 (following 
Payne’s usage).  Both historians offer different but equally powerful critiques of a King-centric 
inspired civic mythology of racial progress in post-civil rights America. 
 39. See, e.g., DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 171 
(1995).  Hollinger credits King with widening the circle of the “we” in “we the people,” by affirming 
a national American “we.”  One could, of course, make a similar claim about Frederick Douglass.  
Id.  I develop this claim about Douglass, and address some of the issues that arise when we consider 
the relationship between race and rights, in my recent book.  See DERRICK DARBY, RIGHTS, RACE, 
AND RECOGNITION 109−41 (2009). 
 40. SINGH, supra note 34, at 10 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC, 
July 31, 1995, at 23). 
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Great Society reforms—the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968—America had seemingly 
provided blacks all that they were owed after having endured the legacies 
of slavery and Jim Crow and having been formally excluded from free 
and equal citizenship in American society. 
Of course there were many challenges associated with the 
implementation of Brown and the civil rights reforms in the face of 
widespread public resistance to the formal imperative of racial 
integration.  And there were many challenges associated with making the 
case that realizing equal opportunity for blacks would ultimately demand 
not only implementing and enforcing anti-discrimination laws, but also 
dealing with widespread socioeconomic racial inequalities, which 
arguably placed blacks at a considerable disadvantage in taking full 
advantage of the removal of de jure barriers to equal civil and political 
participation in American society. 
These challenges notwithstanding, the doors of American society 
were deemed to be fully open for all citizens to do business and make a 
life of their own choosing without being hampered on account of their 
race.  From this vantage point, some critics of race-conscious social 
policy and legal remedies have insisted that government should not 
intervene to elevate, to positively assist, or to enable blacks individually 
or collectively from coming up short as a group, relative to whites, 
according to many measures of well-being, including educational 
achievement.  Rather they argue that blacks should be left to bear the full 
burden of their poor choices when it comes to education, or that they be 
provided with various incentives, both positive and negative, to make 
better choices so that they can fully partake of King’s American dream.  
This charge that poor choices are the main source of black disadvantage 
has typically been directed at blacks that are among the least well off.41  
Moreover, it has been further argued that failure to acknowledge the 
impact of black choices and values on black disadvantage has served to 
widen the gap between blacks and whites along various measures of 
well-being, and has resulted in misplaced emphasis on forms of 
government intervention in the form of affirmative action and welfare 
policy, which have contributed to the problem of black disadvantage 
rather than solved it.42 
                                                          
 41. See BYRON M. ROTH, PRESCRIPTION FOR FAILURE: RACE RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 64 (1994). 
 42. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980 223 
(1984); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 177 (1994); SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: 
THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA 47–48 (1998). 
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The foregoing sketch captures the spirit of what I am calling the 
“post-racial” era in the United States.  Here are its main characteristics: 
(1) affirmation of the inclusive nature of the American ideals of freedom 
and equality; (2) affirmation that the greatest legacy of the civil rights 
movement—understood from a King-centric perspective—was extending 
the scope of these ideals to previously excluded blacks, which resulted in 
a single “race” of Americans blending whites and blacks into a common 
nationality; and (3) affirmation that the creation of a “single” and 
“racially integrated” America has rendered the need for further 
government intervention on behalf of blacks, in particular, unnecessary 
and, moreover, that further intervention would not only be unfair and 
unconstitutional when secured at the expense of non-minorities, but that 
it would be detrimental to further black progress against persistent racial 
inequalities. 
Part of what gives this post-racial outlook purchase is that old-style 
racism, or what has been called “Jim Crow racism,” is no longer with 
us.43  It has been argued that the relative infrequency of overt bigotry, of 
segregationist demands, of public support for government-sponsored 
racial discrimination, and of open and widespread adherence to the belief 
that blacks are biologically inferior to whites, rather than marking an end 
to racism has instead marked a shift to a new form of racism aptly called 
“laissez-faire racism.”44  Aspects of this new racism are said to involve 
“persistent negative stereotyping of African Americans, a tendency to 
blame blacks themselves for the black-white gap in socioeconomic 
standing, and resistance to meaningful policy efforts to ameliorate U.S. 
racist social conditions and institutions.”45  Hence the power of this new 
form of racism lies in acknowledging the persistence of disparities 
between blacks and whites but locating their source in black agency (that 
is, choices that blacks themselves make or fail to make either 
individually or collectively), which undermines the legitimacy of 
government-sponsored intervention to decrease racial disparities. 
Social theorists and social scientists wishing to argue that racial 
discrimination is alive and well in post-racial America (though in the 
form of laissez-faire, not Jim Crow, racism) face a number of challenges, 
two of which are particularly relevant for present purposes.  In addition 
                                                          
 43. Lawrence Bobo et al., Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, 
Antiblack Ideology, in RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1990S: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 17 (Steven A. 
Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 1997).  See also EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT 
RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2–3 (2d ed. 2006). 
 44. Bobo, supra note 43, at 17. 
 45. Id. at 16. 
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to empirically demonstrating the ways in which blacks are disadvantaged 
relative to whites, they must establish causal links between current racial 
inequalities (e.g., in education) and historic racial discrimination during 
slavery and Jim Crow.  Moreover, they must empirically demonstrate 
that current racial inequalities are being maintained, or in some cases 
even worsened, by contemporary racial discrimination.  Proponents of 
this thesis need not hold that racial discrimination is the only factor 
constraining black opportunity in the modern period nor that race is as 
central a factor in the life chances for any given black individual as it 
was in the pre-civil rights era.  Meeting both of these challenges, 
however, is particularly difficult when overt acts of racial discrimination 
are, on the one hand, admittedly less prevalent than before but, on the 
other hand, remain in the eyes of many people the only way of showing 
that racial discrimination operates to undermine black freedom and 
equality.46 
Hence, the main problem for advocates of the persistence of racism 
thesis in the current post-racial era is not that the possibility of racial 
discrimination playing a vital role in accounting for the existence of 
racial inequalities in education and other areas is summarily dismissed.  
Rather, the main problem is with the burden of proof placed on persons 
advancing explanations for the persistence of racial inequalities that 
include a racial discrimination component.  This burden of proof 
demands a particular causal accounting of racial inequalities, by 
establishing racist motives or racist intent, or old-style Jim Crow racism, 
as the basis for any statistical disparities between blacks and whites.  In 
the absence of such proof, some people have been tempted to dismiss 
racial inequalities as merely the effects of agent-driven economic 
transactions in response to various needs, wants, liabilities, and 
incentives in a free market economy rather than the unhappy results of 
bad or racist intentions.47 
Thus, the main problem is that there is no serious acknowledgement 
of the shift from Jim Crow to laissez-faire racism in the post-racial era.  
Consequently, any appeal to racial discrimination accounting for the 
causes of racial disparities or proscribing legal or policy decisions faces 
the constraint of providing evidence of racist intent or motive.  Although 
it is widely acceptable to presume that racial disparities in education, 
                                                          
 46. The problem of overlooking the new racism is partly due to the fact that when racism is 
alleged, individual acts of racial bigotry and violence are often cited as evidence of its persistence.  
But critics are always quick to point out that we cannot generalize from these isolated cases, even if 
they are more frequent than many people realize. 
 47. See SOWELL, supra note 42, at ch. 4. 
2.0 DARBY FINAL 4/23/2009  1:15:42 PM 
770 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
wealth, health, housing, and the criminal justice system are largely due to 
certain agent-relative factors, in the post-racial era, we cannot presume 
that they are due to agent-neutral factors such as racial discrimination.  
Any efforts to link these disparities to racial discrimination are 
compelled to show evidence that racial bias or motive account for the 
racial disparities in question. 
Indeed one can find evidence of this in the courts.  Consider the 
criminal law case, McCleskey v. Kemp, in which Warren McCleskey, a 
black man sentenced to death in Georgia for killing a white police 
officer, challenged the law as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.48  The petitioner’s defense relied upon a statistical study on death 
penalty cases in Georgia showing that “defendants charged with killing 
white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as 
defendants charged with killing blacks.”49  A five-to-four Supreme Court 
decision ruled against McCleskey’s equal protection claim without 
challenging the data showing that he was at a higher risk of being put to 
death because of the race of his victim.50  Instead, the court set aside the 
statistical evidence as irrelevant in capital punishment cases unless there 
was proof of intentional discrimination or proof that racial bias had 
tainted the defendant’s trial.51 
In the next section, I will consider how this inflexible constraint on 
proving racial discrimination has also shaped the pursuit of greater 
equality of educational opportunity between blacks and whites in the 
courts.  In particular, I consider how the University of Michigan School 
of Law sidestepped the burden of proving that past or present racial 
discrimination caused statistical racial inequalities between blacks and 
whites in adopting a race-conscious admissions policy.  I shall be 
particularly concerned with highlighting the role of social scientific 
research on student diversity in the Supreme Court’s ruling, as this will 
enable me to draw a valuable lesson for the black reparations debate in 
Part V. 
 
                                                          
 48. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 49. Id. at 287; see also ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAW 6 (2006). 
 50. 481 U.S. at 290−91; see also ANCHETA, supra note 49, at 6. 
 51. 481 U.S. at 294–95; see also ANCHETA, supra note 49, at 6. 
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IV.  EDUCATION AND THE SCIENCE OF DIVERSITY IN GRUTTER 
On the recommendation of a faculty committee,52 the University of 
Michigan Law School adopted a multi-criteria admissions policy calling 
for each applicant to be evaluated individually based on the entire 
admissions file, which included a personal statement, letters of 
recommendation, undergraduate grade point average, LSAT score, and 
an essay describing ways in which the applicant would contribute to the 
life and diversity of the Law School.53  In making clear that grades and 
scores were not assigned enough weight to guarantee admission in the 
case of high grades and scores or rejection in the case of low ones, the 
Law School emphasized the value of so-called “soft variables,” such as 
the quality and content of the personal statement and essay.54  These 
variables were taken to provide valuable information about how potential 
applicants might usefully advance the Law School’s general educational 
objectives.55 
A vital educational objective of the Law School was to “‘enrich 
everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the 
sum of its parts.’”56  The Law School maintained that achieving student 
body diversity, which would contribute to the intellectual life, social life, 
and the overall character of the Law School, was instrumental in 
achieving this purpose.57  Although the Law School stressed that various 
types of diversity considerations were weighted in the admission process, 
it nonetheless reaffirmed its longstanding commitment to a particular 
type of diversity, namely “‘racial and ethnic diversity with special 
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been 
historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and 
Native Americans . . . .’”58  With the adoption of this admissions policy, 
the Law School asserted an interest in using racial classifications to 
realize the educational benefits it associated with having a racially 
diverse student body. 
 
                                                          
 52. The University of Michigan’s Law School Dean charged a faculty committee in 1992 with 
crafting an admissions policy that complied with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke, 148 U.S. 265 (1978), on the use of race in university admissions.  
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312 (2003). 
 53. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 57. See id. at 316. 
 58. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 
LSAT score, who was denied admission to the Law School, challenged 
the legality of this policy in 1996.  Grutter subsequently filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan alleging 
that the Law School’s admissions policy discriminated against her in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.59  Agreeing 
with the petitioner that the policy was unconstitutional, the District Court 
ruled that the Law School’s asserted interest in realizing the educational 
benefits of a racially diverse student body was not compelling, and even 
if it had been compelling, the policy had not been narrowly tailored to 
further this interest.60  On appeal, a divided United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed this judgment, holding that Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke was binding precedent and established 
diversity as a compelling state interest.61  Moreover, it found that the 
Law School’s use of race was indeed narrowly tailored since race was 
merely a “potential ‘plus’ factor” in a multi-criteria admissions policy.62  
Upon granting certiorari, the pivotal issue brought before the United 
States Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger was “[w]hether diversity is 
a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in 
selecting applicants for admission to public universities.”63 
By finding that the Law School’s interest in attaining the educational 
benefits that flow from a diverse student body was compelling, the Court 
ruled by a narrow five-to-four margin that the Law School’s use of race 
passed the compelling interest requirement of the strict scrutiny test 
established by the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.64  By 
finding that the school’s policy of considering an applicant’s race as a 
“plus” factor along with other individual academic and nonacademic 
factors, and by considering each applicant individually rather than 
merely as a member of a racial group, the Court ruled that the Law 
School’s use of race in a highly individualized and holistic review of 
each applicant’s file was narrowly tailored.65  The Court concluded that 
because the Law School’s race-conscious admissions program was 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 317–18. 
 60. Id. at 321. 
 61. Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (2002) (en banc)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 322.  See Linda S. Greene, The Constitution and Racial Equality After Gratz and 
Grutter, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 253, 255 n.22 (2004) (summarizing federal courts of appeals cases in 
which the question of whether diversity qualifies as a compelling interest is addressed). 
 64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331, 342 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995)). 
 65. Id. at 309, 340, 343. 
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narrowly tailored and asserted a compelling interest in gaining the 
educational benefits of student body diversity, the admissions program 
survived strict scrutiny as required by the Equal Protection Clause.66 
Not since Bakke had the Supreme Court taken up the issue of 
whether using race as a criterion for admission to an institution of higher 
learning violated the Fourteenth Amendment.67  Although Bakke did not 
result in a majority opinion, Justice Powell’s opinion has served as the 
“touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions 
policies.”68  Given the heavy reliance on this opinion by the majority in 
Grutter, it is reasonable to interpret Grutter as making Powell’s opinion 
in Bakke settled law.69  Furthermore, several insights first expressed by 
Powell—and later by the Grutter majority—are paradigmatic instances 
of judicial thought about racial discrimination in the post-racial era that 
embody a clear endorsement of the prevailing King-centric perspective.70  
The first insight is that equal protection of the law applies to individuals 
(not groups), and for the protection to be truly equal it must apply to all 
persons (including whites) that are asked to bear a burden because of 
race.  The second and related insight is that this understanding of equal 
protection proscribes any government use of race designed to reduce 
disadvantages suffered by historically disfavored minorities.  Describing 
such uses as “racial balancing,” Powell contends that using race to set 
aside positions for minorities in professional school would place undue 
burdens on innocent third parties “who bear no responsibility for 
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are 
thought to have suffered.”71  A further insight, which presumably makes 
up for the loss incurred by restricting the scope of backward-looking or 
remedial justifications of race-conscious admissions policies,72 is 
permitting uses of race to advance a forward-looking interest in student 
body diversity provided that it encompasses a broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which race is but a single element.73  
                                                          
 66. Id. at 341–42. 
 67. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1978); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d (federal statute stating: “No person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 68. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 69. See id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting that Justice Powell’s opinion on use of 
race to further interest in diversity was not settled). 
 70. See id. at 344–45 (rejecting this perspective and asserting that race bias and even rank 
discrimination based on race continue to impede realization of our ideals). 
 71. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (majority opinion) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310). 
 72. Id. at 309–10, 323. 
 73. See id. at 340 (upholding an admissions program “consider[ing] race as one factor among 
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Although all uses of race must be subject to strict scrutiny in the post-
racial era—and no uses can be deemed benign absent such scrutiny—not 
all uses of race will fail this test.  Powell’s opinion in Bakke and the 
Grutter majority allow for uses where racial diversity is part of a larger 
project of advancing legitimate educational objectives. 
The general outlook captured by these insights is that there can be no 
presumption that racial disparities are due to past or current race-based 
discrimination against historically disfavored groups.  In the post-racial 
era, we must allow that other factors might account for these things given 
the racial progress that has been made since the civil rights era and the 
subsequent Great Society programs.  In the post-racial era, to establish 
that discrimination is the cause of racial disparities and to justify a race-
conscious remedy one must demonstrate that there was intent or bias 
operating to burden someone because of race. 
Given the great difficulty of establishing this finding, and not merely 
due to the conservative bent of the vast majority of federal judges and the 
majority of Supreme Court Justices, but due to the very complex and 
subtle ways in which race operates in contemporary America—as many 
social scientists have observed—the respondents in Grutter justified their 
race-conscious admissions policy by making an end run around race, as it 
were.  This was accomplished by relying upon a general diversity 
argument, which defended a race-conscious admissions policy (though 
not exclusively or even principally race-conscious) as part of a larger 
strategy of building a more diverse student body to secure the 
educational benefits that flow from such diversity, including: promoting 
learning outcomes; better preparing law students as professionals; and 
better preparing law students for an increasingly diverse workforce, 
society, and global market place.  As the Court notes, with this policy the 
Law School aspired to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to 
enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger 
than the sum of its parts.”74 
This worthy aspiration notwithstanding, perhaps the greatest 
practical virtue of the Law School’s strategy was skillfully adapting the 
justification for its policy to the Powellian insights, which reflect the 
current paradigm of judicial thought about racial discrimination in the 
post-racial era.  Most importantly, the Law School made sure that the 
central argument for its race-conscious admissions policy—the argument 
that carried the day—was a forward-looking argument.  It was an 
                                                                                                                       
 
many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broader than race”). 
 74. Id. at 315 (quoting the University of Michigan Law School’s written admissions policy). 
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argument focused not so much on historical injustice—that is, what 
America has done wrong to blacks and what they are owed and by 
whom—but focused instead on bringing about the commonly desirable 
good of improving educational outcomes for the benefit of law students, 
the Law School, and society in general.  Surely, even the Justices that 
dissented in the case (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, 
J.) could appreciate the way in which this argument plays into the ideal 
of one nation, one race (namely, American) striving to achieve a 
common and positive future that does not turn on laying blame for past 
wrongs or historical injustices and their lingering effects. 
To be sure, the Law School was well aware of the legacy of 
historical injustice toward racial and ethnic minorities in America.  
Indeed, it stressed that the admissions policy reaffirmed the Law 
School’s longstanding commitment to “racial and ethnic diversity with 
special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have 
been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, 
Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might 
not be represented in [the Law School] student body in meaningful 
numbers.”75  Yet by making this kind of diversity just one among many 
types of diversity it sought to achieve, by not giving it greater or special 
weight and, most importantly, by not defending its policy as an effort to 
take affirmative action in favor of racial minorities to overcome the 
disadvantages and exclusions rooted in past wrongs, the Law School 
rendered its argument immune to the obvious objections.  A backward-
looking argument in favor of a race-conscious admissions policy, namely 
one that defended a policy to reduce the deficit of historically 
disadvantaged minorities, would be deemed an unlawful instance of 
racial balancing and unfair to innocent third parties forced to bear the 
burdens of such a policy.76 
Some critics of Grutter will question whether, in the final analysis, 
justifying the adoption of a race-conscious admissions policy as a way to 
achieve certain educational outcomes is better than a more direct 
justification of racial diversity as a way to remedy the legacy of past 
racial wrongs.77  And of course other critics of Grutter will question 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 316 (quoting the University of Michigan Law School’s written admissions policy). 
 76. These are, with slight modification, the same objections that Justice Powell raised in Bakke.  
See id. at 323–24 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306–07, 310 (1978)). 
 77. For a thought-provoking treatment of this question, which argues that Grutter is a weaker 
(and hence less attractive) argument for racial diversity than the remedial argument for it in Brown, 
see Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 691, 694 (2004) (noting that “diversity is the weaker of the two arguments”).  I agree with the 
spirit of Diver’s criticism; however, it may not take adequate account of the limitations of remedial 
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whether the justification for racial diversity—however indirect it may 
be—is nonetheless a blatant attempt to remedy past racial wrongs and is 
thus unlawful (in violation of the Equal Protection Clause) as well as 
unfair.78  But apart from these concerns some persons who are 
sympathetic to the outcome of the case and the general goal of achieving 
a racially and ethnically diverse student body (setting aside whether it be 
justified on backward- or forward-looking grounds) may raise concerns 
about another aspect of the argument that carried the day in Grutter. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the forward-looking argument for 
racial diversity in Grutter is the prominent role played by social 
scientific research in this argument.79  The Grutter majority not only 
acknowledged this role but it also gave deference to the judgment 
supported by this research.  Justice O’Connor observes: “The Law 
School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission is one to which we defer.  The Law School’s 
assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is 
substantiated by respondents and their amici.”80  And she further 
observes: “In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into 
                                                                                                                       
 
arguments in the post-racial era.  In her opinion in Grutter, Justice Ginsburg was more explicit about 
this limitation and offered an understanding of Brown’s legacy in this light; she also embraces a 
strong view of what the Constitution allows in the way of redressing the effects of law-sanctioned 
inequality, a view that finds the Constitution much more supportive of such efforts.  See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  Yet some critics (including some of her fellow Justices) will 
certainly take issue with her interpretation of Brown’s legacy, the causes of inequality she identifies, 
and whether the Constitution empowers government to reduce or eradicate past effects of law-
sanctioned inequality. 
 78. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 374 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
against the majority of the Court who apparently “believe that broader utopian goals justify the Law 
School’s use of race” even though the “‘Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial 
barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized’” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 79. See, e.g., Brief for American Educational Research Association et al., as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398292.  
This brief relied heavily upon the “Gurin Report,” an expert report produced by Patricia Y. Gurin, a 
Professor of Psychology and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan, to demonstrate the 
positive effects of educational diversity.  Analysis of the data lead to several major conclusions 
including: “‘[s]tudents who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in classroom settings 
and in informal interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in active thinking processes, 
growth in intellectual engagement and motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills.’”  
Id. at *5–6 (internal citation omitted).  The Gurin Report found that “diversity leads to ‘a learning 
environment that fosters conscious, effortful, deep thinking’ as opposed to automatic, preconditioned 
responses.”  Id. at *6 (internal citation omitted).  The Report found that diverse learning 
environments resulted in “more active engagement in the learning process and an increased ability to 
understand the perspectives of others.”  Id.  And the Report found that “‘[s]tudents educated in 
diverse settings are more motivated and better able to participate in an increasingly heterogeneous 
and complex democracy . . . .’”  Id. at *7 (internal citation omitted). 
 80. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (majority opinion). 
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evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity 
promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as 
professionals.’”81 
As the amici curiae noted, Grutter would not be the first time the 
Supreme Court relied upon empirical evidence in an equal protection 
case related to race, and to determine whether promoting “educational 
diversity in higher education is a compelling government interest.”82  In 
addition to being a landmark decision in Supreme Court constitutional 
history for taking the monumental step of dismantling racial segregation 
in public schools, Brown v. Board of Education is also heralded for 
having begun the era of reliance upon modern social scientific research 
in judicial decision-making.83  In footnote II of the Brown decision, 
which has been described as “at once the most celebrated and infamous 
footnote in Supreme Court history,”84 Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
opinion for the unanimous Court cites several social scientific studies 
addressing the harms of segregated schools on black children.85 
Following in the footsteps of Brown, the Grutter majority also 
affirmed the value of social science in assessing the constitutionality of 
using a race-conscious policy to achieve diversity in higher education.86  
But in Grutter, unlike Brown, the Court did not relegate the social 
scientific findings it relied upon to a footnote.87  This time, the various 
sources of empirical authority that were introduced in the lower courts 
and in amicus curiae briefs were explicitly discussed in the decision and 
used to support the ruling that student body diversity was a compelling 
interest and that the Law School admissions policy was indeed narrowly 
tailored, thereby surviving the strict scrutiny test and thus proving to be 
lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.88  While reliance upon empirical research has many virtues, 
including affording the decision a measure of empirical authority, it also 
has potential drawbacks, including concerns that the Court is not the 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 330. 
 82. See Amici Curiae Brief, 2003 WL 398292, at *1. 
 83. ANCHETA, supra note 49, at 2. 
 84. Id. at 1. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 2 (“[T]he Grutter Court relied on multiple sources of scientific authority to 
support its holding.”). 
 87. See id. (“In the fifty-plus years that have passed since the Brown decision, scientific 
authority has come to enjoy a prominent but no less contentious place in constitutional interpretation 
and the development of civil rights.”). 
 88. Id. 
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proper venue for screening and filtering scientific evidence speaking to 
such matters as whether student body diversity promotes positive 
educational outcomes.89 
On a related note, some sympathetic critics of Brown worried that 
tethering the desegregation decision to the prevailing social science of 
the day left open the possibility that the vital decision could be 
undermined or even reversed by alternative social scientific research or 
by discrediting the empirical findings cited in Brown.90  Of course, this is 
precisely what happened in Brown, where the segregationists, seeking to 
undo the decision, not only called the empirical findings cited by Brown 
into question, but recruited their own social scientists and marshaled 
their own empirical findings to argue that a segregated learning 
environment would produce the best learning outcomes and that 
desegregated schools actually cause more harm than good, all things 
considered.91 
By embracing an even more thorough-going commitment to 
empirical research findings than Brown, the Grutter Court leaves its 
decision vulnerable to a similar line of attack, which would draw upon 
alternative research findings seeking to show that diversity does not 
produce the claimed educational benefits or that it actually causes 
educational harms or causes more harm than good, all things considered.  
Indeed, this is precisely one of the strategies employed by Justice 
Thomas in his lengthy dissenting opinion, where he maintains: “The 
Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those 
classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate 
motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on 
racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or 
benefits, it demeans us all.”92  According to Justice Thomas, “an interest 
in remedying general societal discrimination,” or racial disparities, is a 
seriously inadequate justification for using racial classification.93  Indeed, 
such classification can only be justified, as he says, “to provide a 
bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence . . . ‘rising to the level of 
                                                          
 89. See id. at 11 (“[M]any judges may lack the technical expertise in science and mathematics 
that would enable them to become the types of ‘amateur scientists’ who could be truly effective 
gatekeepers.”). 
 90. See id. at 3 (“[S]cientific authorities, if they are at all available to inform a legal dispute, 
can be relied upon, declared irrelevant, ignored, or even discredited by judges in a given case.”). 
 91. See WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 149 (1994). 
 92. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 93. Id. 
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imminent danger to life and limb.’”94  Moreover, Justice Thomas has 
frequently insisted that when it comes to the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause we cannot distinguish between benign and suspect 
uses of racial classification (a point that Justice Powell emphasizes as 
well in Bakke, although Powell seems to allow strict judicial scrutiny to 
determine if a use of race is benign, whereas Justice Thomas seems to 
rule out all but very limited uses as benign in advance of such scrutiny).95 
Setting up one of his challenges to the majority ruling in Grutter, 
Justice Thomas maintains: “The Court’s deference to the Law School’s 
conclusion that its racial experimentation leads to educational benefits 
will, if adhered to, have serious collateral consequences.  The Court 
relies heavily on social science evidence to justify its deference.”96  He 
then takes issue with what he takes to be a crucial oversight.  Justice 
Thomas contends: “The Court never acknowledges, however, the 
growing evidence that racial (and other sorts) of heterogeneity actually 
impairs learning among black students.”97  He then cites two studies, one 
published in the Journal of College Student Development, “concluding 
that black students [at Historically Black Colleges (HBCs)] experience 
superior cognitive development . . . and that, even among blacks,” the 
more diversity they are exposed to the more moderate the effects of 
attending an HBC.98  The other study, published in the Harvard 
Education Review, finds that blacks “attending HBCs report higher 
academic achievement than those attending predominantly white 
colleges.”99  In addition to suggesting that racial diversity might actually 
impair learning among black students according to these and other 
studies, Justice Thomas notes that social science has not discredited the 
views that affirmative action ‘“engender[s] attitudes of [racial] 
superiority or, alternatively, provoke[s] [racial] resentment among those 
who believe that they have been wronged by’” race-conscious policies.100 
Hence, we see that by relying on empirical findings to support its 
ruling that an interest in achieving educational diversity is compelling, 
the Grutter majority ruling is vulnerable to Justice Thomas’s attack, 
                                                          
 94. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 368 (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits all types of 
“classifications made on the basis of race”). 
 96. Id. at 364. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 364–65. 
 100. Id. at 373 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., concurring)). 
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which challenges the decision by taking on—at least in part—the 
conclusiveness of the studies cited, which are at odds with the alternative 
empirical findings that Justice Thomas elicits.  Although my present 
purposes do not require me to take issue with the studies that Justice 
Thomas cites, and I am certain that those better informed about the 
empirical debate on the issue would have much to say, it is nevertheless 
important to note that social scientists have certainly disagreed about the 
educational benefits of racial diversity.101  So, even if these studies are 
found lacking, or if Justice Thomas’s use of them is unconvincing, his 
objection raises a real concern.  What do we make of competing 
empirical findings that challenge the authority of the findings to which 
the majority in Grutter defers?  As I noted earlier, there are many 
competing empirical explanations of the racial achievement gap and the 
benefits and burdens of segregated schools, and some of these 
explanations would undoubtedly lend support to Justice Thomas’s 
objections.102 
We see therefore that the appeal to social science in judicial rulings 
comes at a cost: it opens the door to reliance on contrary empirical 
findings to take issue with rulings that we are otherwise sympathetic to.  
Of course this is not a deep objection to social science per se, as we 
could believe that some empirical explanations of the facts are simply 
incorrect, or that some are simply much better than others.  Accordingly, 
one way to proceed in response to Justice Thomas would be to directly 
take on the empirical findings and conclusions that he presumes to raise 
against the ones relied upon by the Grutter majority.  For this purpose we 
will certainly need much more input from social scientists.  Moreover, 
the Court will need a reliable way to adjudicate the debate. 
In the absence of a resolution to this debate, the courts must be 
mindful of how legal reasoning informed by particular empirical 
explanations is susceptible to challenges that reject the proffered 
explanations in favor of others.  By the same token, normative political 
philosophers must be mindful of how prevailing normative arguments for 
                                                          
 101. See Mickelson, supra note 26, at 1062–63 (referring to empirical literature, which argues, 
contrary to Justice Thomas, that desegregated schools result in better outcomes for black students). 
 102. Recently, some prominent social scientists have argued that, at least in the short run, 
diversity may be undesirable for a variety of reasons.  See, e.g., Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus 
Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 
30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 138 (2007) (“Increased immigration and diversity are not only 
inevitable, but over the long run they are also desirable. . . . In the short to medium run, however, 
immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital.”).  I suppose 
that these findings might lend some support to Justice Thomas’s objections; however, if, as Putnam 
suggests, diversity turns out to be a good thing in the long run, then the force of Justice Thomas’s 
objection is diminished by these findings. 
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reparations, which similarly rely upon empirical findings regarding the 
causes of racial disparities in education and in other areas, are vulnerable 
to similar challenges.  This is the lesson that I shall now develop for the 
reparations debate against the backdrop of the foregoing reflections on 
educational inequality and the social science of racial diversity in 
Grutter. 
V. A LESSON FOR THE BLACK REPARATIONS DEBATE 
Black chattel slavery as practiced in the United States until slavery’s 
demise in 1865 was a historical injustice.  So too was the legacy of post-
slavery forced racial segregation of blacks and whites under local, state, 
and national law, as well as public policies that prescribed and permitted 
the separate and unequal treatment of blacks and whites in the public and 
private spheres.  These historical injustices have left enduring marks on 
contemporary American society, foremost of which are the enduring 
inequalities between blacks and whites along various measures of well-
being including but not limited to inequalities in education, wealth, 
health, housing, and the administration of criminal justice.103  The 
persistence of these empirically demonstrable racial inequalities—long 
after the demise of slavery and Jim Crow—has been at the center of the 
public debate about reparations as well as more general debates about 
social justice. 
Consider the recent congressional hearing on bill H.R. 40104 to study 
slavery and its impact on American society and subsequent generations 
of slave descendants.  This bill, which Representative John Conyers of 
Michigan has re-introduced every year since first proposing it in 1989, 
seeks to do four things: (1) acknowledge the fundamental injustice and 
inhumanity of slavery; (2) establish a commission to study slavery and 
the subsequent racial and economic discrimination against freed slaves; 
(3) study the impact of this legacy of discrimination on contemporary 
African-Americans; and (4) make recommendations to Congress on 
appropriate remedies to redress the harm inflicted on living African-
                                                          
 103. Papers in this symposium issue offer social scientific and theoretical perspectives on some 
of these persistent racial inequalities.  See generally Ronald Caldwell Jr., The Erosion of Affirmative 
Action and its Consequences for the Black-White Educational Attainment Gap, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 
813 (2009); Peterson & Krivo, supra note 8; Spohn, supra note 8; Western & Wildeman, supra note 
8. 
 104. Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 110th 
Cong. (2007).  At the beginning of the 111th Congress, Representative John Conyers, Jr., of 
Michigan reintroduced this legislation.  See Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for 
African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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Americans.105  After almost two decades, this bill finally got a hearing on 
December 18, 2007 during a meeting of the Congressional Subcommittee 
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties.  During this 
historic hearing the issue of persistent racial disparities and black 
disadvantage relative to whites figured prominently in some of the 
testimony by supporters as well as critics of the bill.106 
During the hearing, Representative Conyers cited empirical data 
which he contended linked current racial disparities in education and in 
the poverty rate to the legacy of slavery: namely that the black high 
school drop-out rate is fifty percent compared to twenty-three percent for 
whites; that the national average scores in math, science and reading for 
black seventeen year olds are comparable to the scores for white thirteen 
year olds; and that the poverty rate of blacks, at twenty-four percent, is 
twice the national average.107  But critics of reparations rejected this 
explanation of the racial achievement and poverty gaps. 
One critic of the bill, Roger Clegg, a former deputy in the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division from 1987 to 1991, and 
president and general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity, a 
nonprofit research and educational organization in Falls Church, 
Virginia, testified that the proposals in H.R. 40 are an unnecessary, 
hopeless, and divisive task “ill-suited” for a government commission.108  
During his testimony Clegg contended: 
The principal hurdle facing African Americans today is the fact that 
seven out of [ten] African Americans are born out of wedlock.  Just 
about any social problem that you can name—crime, drugs, dropping 
out of school, doing poorly in school and so forth—has a strong 
correlation with growing up in a home without a father.  And it is very 
hard to argue that this problem is traceable to slavery or Jim Crow, 
since illegitimacy rates in the African American community began to 
skyrocket just at about the time that Jim Crow was starting to 
crumble.109 
                                                          
 105. H.R. 40, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 40, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 106. Legacy of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(2007) [hereinafter Hearings] (hearing to discuss H.R. 40, 110th Cong. (2007)) available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov//cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:39707. 
pdf. 
 107. See id.  I provide a more detailed account of the relevant education statistics on the racial 
achievement gap in Part II of this Article.  For a detailed presentation of the case linking racial 
inequalities in education to slavery and Jim Crow segregation, see BROOKS, supra note 7. 
 108. Hearings, supra note 106, at 28, 30 (testimony of Roger Clegg). 
 109. Id. at 29. 
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Another critic, Stephan Thernstrom, Professor of History at Harvard and 
member of the Manhattan Institute, adopted essentially the same 
explanation of enduring economic disparities between whites and 
blacks.110  He contended: 
The principal source of black poverty today, for example, is African 
American family structure.  One-paycheck families (or zero-paycheck 
families who are dependent upon public assistance) are far more likely 
to fall into poverty than two-parent, two-paycheck families.  Blaming 
African-American out-of-wedlock births and absent fathers upon an 
institution that disappeared 142 years ago makes little sense.111 
These critics opt for what might be called black agent-relative 
explanations of persistent racial disparities, namely ones that locate their 
root causes in the action (or inaction) of blacks themselves. 
In contrast, Tommy Wells, then president-elect of the American Bar 
Association, was present at the hearing to indicate the ABA’s support, in 
principle, for H.R. 40.112  In addition to citing Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger as an authority for the claim 
that “rank discrimination based on race” remains alive and continues to 
impede the nation’s realization of its highest values and ideals, Wells 
cited Justice Kennedy’s address before the American Bar Association in 
2004 as support for the persistence of racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system in particular.113  Furthermore he added to Kennedy’s 
findings by noting the following: 
Even though African-Americans comprise only 13% of the American 
population, over 44% of the 1.4 million persons incarcerated in 2003 
were black[.]  A report released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
found that a black male had a 1 in 3 chance of being imprisoned during 
his lifetime, compared to a 1 in 6 chance for a Latino male and a 1 in 
17 chance for a white male.  Nearly 10% of black males age 25 to 29 
are incarcerated compared with 1.1% of white males in the same age 
group, and black females are five times more likely to be incarcerated 
than white females.114 
                                                          
 110. Id. at 82–86 (testimony of Stephan Thernstrom). 
 111. Id. at 85. 
 112. Id. at 72 (testimony of Tommy Wells). 
 113. Id. at 72–73. 
 114. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).  For illuminating social scientific perspectives on racial 
disparities and criminal justice, see the papers in this symposium issue by Ruth Peterson and Lauren 
Krivo, Cassia Spohn, and Bruce Western.  See Peterson & Krivo, supra note 8; Spohn, supra note 8; 
Western & Wildeman, supra note 8. 
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To be sure, Wells admits that there is serious disagreement about the 
causes of these enduring racial disparities in the criminal justice system, 
but they certainly lend themselves to an explanation that grounds these 
disparities in some sort of systemic discrimination based on race.115  This 
is an instance of what might be called a black agent-neutral explanation 
of persistent racial disparities, one that locates their root causes in 
something other than the actions (or inactions) of black agents. 
The foregoing explanations of racial inequalities in the public debate 
draw or rely upon empirical scholarship.  Social scientists, including 
sociologists and economists, have compiled and analyzed data pertaining 
to racial disparities that now figures prominently not only in academic 
discussions of reparations but also in the halls of Congress and in the 
courts as the legislative and judicial branches of government labor to 
determine what—if anything further—the United States must do to come 
to terms with the nation’s legacy of slavery and segregation.  In the 
quotation from Justice Benjamin Cardozo, with which I began this 
Article, Cardozo implores the courts to view statutes not in isolation but 
in view of present-day conditions as revealed by the labor of economists 
and other social scientists.116  Everyone who shares this pragmatic 
outlook should certainly applaud the law’s engagement with the social 
scientists as it seeks to understand and apply our abiding legal and 
normative principles to the issue of black reparations. 
In this Article, I have focused on black and white inequalities in 
educational achievement.  Although my concern has not been to connect 
these inequalities to the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow, others have 
certainly done this, as I have already noted.117  As we shall see shortly, 
establishing the connection between these past wrongs and persistent 
racial inequalities in education (and in other areas) has been vital to 
recent scholarly arguments for black reparations.  A strong normative 
case can be made for reparations (provided that the nature and scope of 
the moral obligation is properly understood); however, making this case 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  For now I want to raise a concern 
about a commonplace normative argument for black reparations—an 
argument that forges a strong causal link between the past wrongs of 
slavery and Jim Crow and present-day inequalities between blacks and 
                                                          
 115. Hearings, supra note 106, at 79.  Roslyn Arlin Mickelson also takes account of this 
disagreement in arguing for the primacy of the racial discrimination hypothesis.  See Mickelson, 
supra note 26. 
 116. See CARDOZO, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7. 
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whites.118  By calling this argument into question I aim to provide a 
justification for seeking an alternative normative argument for black 
reparations, one that is better equipped to accommodate the full sweep of 
empirical explanations of racial inequalities that both supporters and 
critics of reparations have found compelling.119 
Not surprisingly, many reasonable people sharply disagree about 
how best to explain the widely accepted empirical facts pertaining to 
persistent racial inequalities between blacks and whites.120  Furthermore, 
many of these people disagree about how best to redress the historical 
injustice suffered by previous and current generations of black 
Americans in a liberal democratic society with a deep and abiding 
commitment to the normative ideals of freedom, justice, and equality.  
Careful consideration of the opposing arguments reveals that in many 
instances these empirical and normative perspectives are interrelated, 
such that the empirical perspectives on the root causes of ongoing racial 
inequalities in education, wealth, health, and crime strongly correlate 
with normative perspectives about what a liberal democratic society 
owes the racially disadvantaged.  For some time now, this general 
relationship between empirical and normative perspectives on racial 
inequality has figured into scholarly and public policy debates about 
welfare, affirmative action, education, crime, and health care reform.  
But with increasing frequency it now figures into the current debate over 
the controversial question of whether the United States owes blacks 
reparations for slavery and its aftermath. 
For example, within moral and legal debates about reparations we 
see that social science is increasingly called upon to support the claim 
that present-day black descendants of slaves in the United States suffer 
the effects of harms that are traceable to the past wrong of slavery 
perpetrated against their ancestors and are therefore entitled to redress.  
This general relationship between the empirical and the normative is 
                                                          
 118. Although many people have offered versions of this argument, I am particularly interested 
in recent formulations of this argument in the emerging philosophical literature on reparations.  See 
David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 1375 (2004); Thomas McCarthy, Coming to Terms with the Past, Part II: On the 
Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 32 POL. THEORY 750 (2004); and Jonathan Kaplan 
& Andrew Valls, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Black Reparations, 21 PUB. AFF. Q. 255 
(2007).  
 119. Of course this is not to suggest that all explanations are equal in merit or are equally 
compelling.  I certainly do not think that they are.  However, this need not prevent us from crafting a 
philosophical normative argument that can accommodate these competing explanations. 
 120. In Part II, I discuss some of the disagreements over the causes of educational inequality in 
particular.  It should be obvious that some of these causes can be generalized to apply to other kinds 
of inequality as well. 
2.0 DARBY FINAL 4/23/2009  1:15:42 PM 
786 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
salient in the corrective justice argument for black reparations, which is 
arguably the most common and influential normative argument for 
reparations.121 
The basic idea underlying the pursuit of corrective justice, a moral 
idea that can be traced back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,122 
demands that if party A wrongfully harms party B, then A has a prima 
facie moral obligation to repair or make amends, so far as possible, for 
the wrongful harm to B.  There can, of course, be debate about what 
exactly discharging this objection amounts to.  Does it amount to A 
making B whole for the losses suffered?  Or does it amount to A or some 
other party creating conditions for A and B to have good future relations 
despite the history and legacy of injustice between them?  However we 
articulate the precise nature of this obligation, the general point—which 
seems sensible to most people—is that corrective justice demands taking 
concrete steps to right past wrongs.  This normative ideal seems well-
suited to make the case for reparations, particularly if one accepts the 
presumption that previous racial disparities and black disadvantage 
relative to whites and current disparities are due to similar causes rooted 
in the past wrongs of slavery and segregation. 
But various objections have been raised against applying this idea to 
reparations.  Some critics contend that facts having to do with mixed 
racial ancestry and the resulting mixed racial identities make it virtually 
impossible to determine who is owed and who should pay reparations, 
pointing out possibilities in which particular blacks may owe reparations 
due to having slaveholding ancestors while particular whites may be 
owed reparations due to having slave ancestors.123  Other critics contend 
that if upholding justice is really at issue in corrective justice arguments 
for reparations, then we must consider that the passage of time can result 
in the normative claim for repairing past wrongs being in competition 
with more recent competing normative claims that preclude—on grounds 
of justice—taking certain reparative courses of action that will impact 
current or future generations.124  Perhaps the most frequently pressed 
objection, however, is that the perpetrators of the past wrong and its 
victims are long dead, in which case there are no parties that rightfully 
stand to benefit and none that must make amends.  Some critics of 
                                                          
 121. For more on the importance of this argument, see generally Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking 
Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 683 (2004). 
 122. See generally ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (2d ed. Terence Irwin trans., 2000). 
 123. See, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, Who? Whom? Reparations and the Problem of Agency, 37 J. 
SOC. PHIL. 330, 334–40 (2006). 
 124. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 14–28 (1992). 
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reparations believe that this objection poses a fatal problem for defenders 
of black reparations, preventing them from firmly establishing that any 
parties are morally or legally responsible for slavery and its aftermath. 
We find a version of this objection in a recent Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals decision on reparations.  In this decision, the Court concluded 
that not only do descendants of slaves lack moral standing for any 
redress on corrective justice grounds but they also lack legal standing.  
Writing for the Court, Judge Posner puts the point this way: 
[T]here is a fatal disconnect between the victims and the plaintiffs.  
When a person is wronged he can seek redress, and if he wins, his 
descendants may benefit, but the wrong to the ancestor is not a wrong 
to the descendants.  For if it were, then (problems of proof to one side) 
statutes of limitations would be toothless.  A person whose ancestor 
had been wronged a thousand years ago could sue on the ground that it 
was a continuing wrong and he is one of the victims.125 
So when applied to the historical injustice of slavery and its aftermath, 
the corrective justice argument is that certain parties are said to have 
perpetrated past wrongs against slaves and consequently have a moral 
and legal obligation to repair these wrongs and make the victims whole.  
However, the argument faces obvious objections in this form, most 
significantly that present-day blacks lack the moral and legal standing to 
be owed redress. 
Defenders of reparations have not abandoned the case in view of this 
objection.  Instead they have modified the corrective justice argument.  
One modification has been to focus more on past harms associated with 
Jim Crow racial segregation and the period immediately following the 
demise of segregation rather than the harms associated with slavery.126  
Here the presumption is that comparisons between the actual 
circumstances of blacks and counterfactual ones are much less difficult if 
we concentrate on this more recent period of time.127  Along with this, 
defenders of reparations have proposed more nuanced accounts of who  
 
                                                          
 125. In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2006).  Some 
philosophers have challenged the presumption that there can be a moral statute of limitations on 
rectifying injustice.  See, e.g., Rodney C. Roberts, Another Look at a Moral Statute of Limitations on 
Injustice, 11 J. ETHICS 177 (2007). 
 126. BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 93 (1973); and Emma Coleman 
Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557, 558 (2003). 
 127. See Kaplan & Valls, supra note 118, at 256–59.  See also Rodney C. Roberts, The 
Counterfactual Conception of Compensation, 37 METAPHILOSOPHY 414, 414−28 (2006) (skeptical 
of counterfactual conceptions of rectificatory arguments). 
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constitute the perpetrators and victims of the past wrongs, and who is 
ultimately responsible for righting these wrongs. 
The most crucial amendment to the corrective justice argument has 
been to establish that descendants of slaves suffer continuing harm.  For 
this modified version of the corrective justice argument to go through, it 
must be demonstrated that the past wrongs associated with slavery and 
its aftermath have harmed—or are continuing to harm—present-day 
blacks whose ancestors were slaves, so as to make clear that the victims 
due redress are not only those individuals that have long since died but 
also individuals that are living today.  Within the scholarly literature on 
reparations the most compelling way of meeting this requirement has 
been to establish a causal connection between the past wrongs of slavery 
and racial apartheid under Jim Crow, and the current racial inequalities in 
which blacks are statistically overrepresented in the ranks of the worst 
off and underrepresented in the ranks of the better off when it comes to 
educational achievement, health, income, wealth, entanglements with the 
criminal justice system, and so on.128 
So, for instance, with respect to racial disparities in health it has been 
recently argued: 
 A large gap in health exists between Blacks and Whites, and it is 
inextricably linked to the history of race and racism in the United 
States.  Racial differences in SES and health are the predictable results 
of the successful implementation of residential segregation, a policy 
that was deliberately set up to create separate and unequal living 
conditions for Blacks.  It and other aspects of racism remain central 
determinants of racial differences in health.  Thus, the legacy of slavery 
and legal discrimination still matters for African Americans in the 21st 
century.129 
Here the authors conclude that these current racial disparities in health, 
traceable to racial segregation, provide a basis (on corrective justice 
grounds) for black reparations.  In the scholarly literature we also find 
powerful complementary arguments linking the legacy of slavery and 
post-slavery racial segregation to other persistent racial disparities.  
Some argue that housing discrimination itself, as practiced during and 
                                                          
 128. Paying attention to these causal connections when considering the matter of reparations is 
not a new phenomenon.  Boris Bittker made this point in his book, BITTKER, supra note 126 at 24–
26.  In addition to the philosophical sources of empirically-informed corrective justice arguments 
cited earlier, see Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black 
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 438–49 (1998). 
 129. David R. Williams & Chiquita Collins, Reparations: A Viable Strategy to Address the 
Enigma of African American Health, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 977, 995–96 (2004). 
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immediately after Jim Crow—setting aside the health related problems—
provides a basis for black reparations.130  Others have explored the 
connections between residential segregation during and after slavery in 
tracing the roots of educational inequalities between blacks and whites, 
taking the latter inequalities to provide an independent basis for black 
reparations.131  And yet others have examined the relationship between 
differential racial patterns of violence and residential racial segregation 
as a basis for some form of reparations.132 
For those of us sharing a particular explanatory narrative regarding 
the history of race relations in the United States—both prior to and after 
the civil rights movement—this causal connection seems to be relatively 
obvious and does not require much effort to prove.  However, for reasons 
that I will now sketch, establishing this causal connection between the 
wrongs of the past and present-day racial inequalities in education, 
crime, health, housing, and in other areas, is a considerably more 
daunting task than one might expect, especially when it comes to 
persuading a person to embrace a corrective justice argument for 
reparations who does not share our explanatory historical narrative, or 
our understanding of the empirical causes of persistent racial disparities.  
This obstacle to linking the racial wrongs of the past with current racial 
inequalities is endemic to the post-racial era in America. 
In these newly fashioned corrective justice arguments for 
reparations—where the empirical meets the normative—social scientific 
research is called upon to establish the causal connection between past 
wrongs and current inequalities.  The normative arguments are not only 
tethered to empirical findings, but to particular empirical explanations of 
the phenomena, say, black agent-neutral rather than black agent-relative 
explanations.133  Hence we find defenders of reparations challenging 
critics who seek to ground the causes of black disadvantage in facts 
about blacks themselves (e.g., propensities to engage in violent behavior 
or to shy away from studying and hard work) by contending: 
Those who blame the victims of hypersegregation for the culture of 
hypersegregation are getting the causal story backward.  The 
                                                          
 130. See sources cited supra note 118. 
 131. See BROOKS, supra note 7. 
 132. See Peterson & Krivo, supra note 8. 
 133. Peterson and Krivo provide a useful way of capturing the agent-neutral versus agent-
relative distinction: “Taking this perspective shows how differential patterns of violence across 
ethnoracial groups are products of structural relations of society rather than stemming from 
individual differences in propensities to engage in violent behavior.”  Id. at 904.  This quotation is 
illuminating because it shows how some social scientists draw a sharp distinction between the agent-
neutral and agent-relative explanations. 
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institutionalized, federally sanctioned and implemented discrimination 
that was instrumental in creating the black ghetto and the black 
underclass was largely the work of individual and corporate agents of 
the white majority, which was thereby continuing through transforming 
the institutionalized domination over blacks it inherited from slavery.  
And now, it appears, those ghettos and that underclass are self-
reproducing, linked in a causal feedback loop of race and poverty.  
They will not disappear themselves, without the political will to repair 
the damages of slavery and segregation.134 
Putting considerable weight on this causal story to complete the 
argument will not only require the input of the social sciences, it 
obviously makes the corrective justice argument vulnerable to critics 
who question the empirical findings.  To be sure, some of these critics 
are somewhat more sensible than ones who suggest that defenders of 
reparations, positing such causal connections, are relying upon ideology 
(in a pejorative sense), not science.135  A more sensible and charitable 
critic might elicit empirically grounded reasons for thinking that the 
plight of blacks on the short side of inequalities today has much more to 
do with their own choices rather than older (or even newer) forms of 
racial discrimination.  Indeed, with respect to the educational inequalities 
between blacks and whites discussed in Part II, some of these critics 
might add that black underachievement relative to whites need not be 
construed as evidence of black cultural dysfunction (as some less 
charitable critics have suggested).  Instead, it could be construed as the 
result of very rational decision-making. 
For example, according to an increasingly popular economic 
explanation of persistent and quantifiable racial disparities in educational 
achievement between black and white students, the impact of the social 
environment of black students—particularly racial peer group 
influence—on their choices is taken to be the primary empirical 
explanation for blacks performing poorer than whites on a variety of 
measures of educational achievement.136  From this vantage point race 
does indeed matter when it comes to understanding the racial 
achievement gap, but not in the way that many people think.  From this 
                                                          
 134. See McCarthy, supra note 118, at 764. 
 135. See generally DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS 
FOR SLAVERY (2002). 
 136. David Austen-Smith & Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Economic Analysis of “Acting White”, 120 
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economic perspective, race matters in understanding why the racial 
achievement gap is first and foremost a problem that stems from strategic 
black student choices in response to their black peers, rather than one 
that stems from racial discrimination or institutional racism in the 
delivery of education. 
Hence, a more sophisticated and more charitable critic who focused 
on the question of whether blacks are owed reparations for educational 
inequality might draw on these and similar research findings to 
undermine an empirically-informed normative argument for reparations 
that embraces a black agent-neutral explanation of educational 
inequality.  I am not interested in trying to adjudicate this disagreement 
here.  Rather, my concern has been to highlight the fact that empirical 
work is called upon both to defend and challenge corrective justice 
arguments for reparations in both scholarly and public debates, which 
brings us to the main lesson of this Article. 
The foregoing demonstrates that corrective justice arguments for 
black reparations seeking to forge a link between past wrongs and 
present racial inequalities are vulnerable to the kind of attack launched 
by Justice Thomas in Grutter.  In Grutter, the Court upheld the use of 
race as an admissions criterion for purposes of achieving educational 
diversity,137 but rejected the use of race as a means of remedying past 
societal discrimination.138  Had it pursued this remedial strategy, the 
University of Michigan Law School would have been asked to 
demonstrate how past discrimination, understood narrowly, was 
operative and why it required such a remedy.139  This would have been a 
hard sell given the unreasonable burden placed upon parties seeking to 
establish racial discrimination in this post-racial era. 
By opting to look forward to the benefits of racial and other kinds of 
student diversity, the Law School anchored its case in a particular 
empirical take on the educational benefits of diversity (racial and 
otherwise) and managed to sell the argument to the Court.  But this 
created an opening for Justice Thomas and others not sold on the 
argument.  It invited these critics to challenge the argument by taking 
issue with the Law School’s empirical analysis of the educational 
benefits of racial diversity.  Although this counterattack was 
underdeveloped in many respects, one can certainly imagine a much 
                                                          
 137. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Some critics have argued that the Grutter Court should have adopted the stronger strategy 
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more formidable attack being advanced along these lines.  By the same 
token, one can also envision a much more formidable challenge being 
mounted against corrective justice arguments for reparations tethered to 
black agent-neutral explanations of the causes of racial inequality.  To 
my mind, what makes these challenges particularly worrisome is that 
insofar as they are grounded in black agent-relative explanations of racial 
inequality, they will have considerable appeal in this post-racial era 
where laissez-faire racism or racism without racists prevails.140 
Some scholars will contend that we should simply fight it out by 
showing that the competing empirical explanations relied upon by these 
critics are flawed, ideological, or do not provide the best explanation of 
the data.  Alternatively, others might contend that these critics have not 
identified the root causes of racial inequality.  These may prove to be 
profitable strategies and are well worth pursuing.  However,  
philosophers, political theorists, legal scholars, and anyone else who has 
an interest in these matters will certainly have to leave it to the social 
scientists to fight this battle, though it is far from clear how we will 
declare a winner.  In the meantime, it would be useful to have a 
normative argument ready at hand that is not held hostage to the outcome 
of this battle, that is, the battle over how to account for the root causes of 
the racial achievement gap and other racial inequalities. 
The labor of social scientists is indispensable for fashioning an 
empirically-informed normative argument for what we owe those on the 
short side of racial inequalities.  I have offered reasons for thinking that 
the most attractive argument may be one that is indifferent to which 
empirical explanations we embrace.  Such an argument for reparations 
might be described as an “unscientific” argument for reparations.  This is 
not to say that the argument ignores the social scientific explanations.  
Rather it attempts to take the full range of possibilities into consideration 
in accounting for why we owe what we owe, normatively speaking.  This 
argument would stand in sharp contrast with prevailing corrective justice 
arguments for reparations that require a more definitive commitment to 
particular empirical explanations of the root causes of racial inequality. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that corrective justice arguments for 
black reparations tethered to particular social scientific explanations of 
racial inequalities will be open to the same kind of counterattack 
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launched by Justice Thomas against the social science-backed argument 
for racial diversity in Grutter.  An important aspect of the corrective 
justice reparations argument is to establish the causal link between the 
past wrongs of racial slavery and segregation and current racial 
inequalities in education and in other areas.  I suspect that many people 
are inclined to agree that there is some kind of relationship between the 
racial achievement gap and the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow, though 
there will certainly be much disagreement about the strength of this 
relationship.  A rather forceful way of highlighting the connection 
between these past racial wrongs and the current racial achievement gap 
is to contend:  “[A]lthough Jim Crow schools have been outlawed, black 
students, including middle-class black students, are still receiving a Jim 
Crow level of education.”141 
It is unclear whether President Barack Obama had this strong a 
connection in mind when he remarked, “I think the reparations we need 
right here in South Carolina is investment, for example, in our 
schools.”142  But it seems quite clear that any effort to justify the pursuit 
of reparations for educational inequality on moral or legal grounds may 
do best to avoid tethering the normative case for reparations to racial 
discrimination-based empirical explanations of the causes of racial 
educational inequality.  For in this post-racial, or post-Obama era, 
empirical explanations that tie black underachievement to choices that 
blacks make (or fail to make) when it comes to education are as 
popular—if not more popular—than explanations that link black 
underachievement to the persistence of racism in contemporary America.  
While I share President Obama’s sentiment that addressing the racial 
achievement gap could be part of a broad strategy of black reparations, in 
this day and age the most compelling and pragmatically feasible 
argument for this will be one that can reach an empirically-informed 
normative conclusion regardless of the perspective one takes on the 
empirical causes of racial inequalities in education. 
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